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Revisiting Domestic Intelligence
Abstract
This article looks at the evolution of US domestic intelligence prior to and since 9/11 in
light of the Capitol attacks. It also reviews the literature and practice of intelligence reform
in the context of foreign comparative experience (France, UK, Canada, Australia). It looks
at the promise of fusion centers, cocontemporay domestic intelligence models, and the
continuing need for domestic intelligence reform.
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Introduction
The January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol exposed seams
in the domestic intelligence framework of the United States.1 While the
full story is yet to be told, initial reports suggest a breakdown in
interagency threat assessment and communications.2 Indeed, some
officials blame a breakdown in intelligence—specifically sharing threat
intelligence among agencies—for the operational deficiencies in
response.3 This lack of early warning raises concerns about the
interagency threat assessment and information sharing capacity of the
nation’s law enforcement, police and intelligence organizations. In
addition to numerous open source indicators on social media, at least
some law enforcement agencies were aware of potential threats. For
example, on the eve of the insurrection, reports from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) field office in Norfolk, Virginia detailed specific
threats to the Capitol but that threat information did not make it to
Capitol Police commanders.4
A comprehensive assessment of the intelligence function and operational
facets of the response to the insurrection—both the immediate attack and
conditions leading up to it—are warranted.5 Many questions remain. Was
the event an intelligence failure?6 If so of what type: Was it an
operational failure or was it a failure of operations-intelligence fusion?7
While preliminary inquiries have shown that the flow of information
among agencies was far from perfect, the comprehensive operational
dimensions of those transactions have not yet been fully evaluated.
Toward that end, some analysts, such as Brian Michael Jenkins, have
suggested a national commission to investigate the attacks.8
While efforts to form a commission similar to the 9/11 Commission9 have
failed to materialize due to partisan resistance,10 there is a need to address
the still unresolved foundations of domestic intelligence.11 For that
assessment, this article provides an overview of the historical context of
domestic intelligence in the United States, defines the scope of the
domestic intelligence enterprise, and assesses the post-9/11 reforms.
Finally, it shares foreign perspectives on intelligence to inform current and
future debate.12
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Defining Domestic Intelligence
What is domestic intelligence? This question is recurring; one that tends to
rise to the forefront after a security crisis or significant threat. The
contemporary discussion of domestic intelligence and all of its ramifications
was, of course, catalyzed by the September 11, 2001 attacks, which exposed
the United States to the threat of global terrorism. The attacks engendered a
range of new approaches to the relationship between law enforcement and
intelligence, and challenged the conventional conception of how the
different levels of intelligence and law enforcement should interact with each
other within the United States. Since 9/11 is widely described as an
intelligence failure, it is natural that an examination of intelligence
structure–both foreign and domestic, as well as across that divide—arose.13
The discussion of domestic intelligence has arisen again in light of the
insurrection on January 6, 2021, when Trump-supporters attacked the
Capitol in an attempt to stop the certification of the newly-elected
President Biden. While the insurrection raised legion political questions, it
also—once again—raised the specter of a failure of both law enforcement
and domestic intelligence-sharing.
Within the American context, domestic intelligence has been defined
by what it is not—other than foreign.14 Indeed, most contemporary
discussion has focused on bridging the foreign-domestic intelligence
divide because this divide is most extreme within the United States.15
In addition, many discussions of domestic intelligence have been
focused on counterterrorism (CT), thus “the term domestic intelligence
and homeland security intelligence are often used colloquially and
interchangeably by some observers.”16
According to Sherman Kent, widely viewed as the father of
contemporary intelligence analysis, intelligence involves knowledge,
organization and activity. In Kent's view, this was focused on “highlevel, foreign, positive intelligence” and excluded happenings in the
United States—what Kent called the domestic scene, and the police
function. Kent viewed these as “security intelligence.”17 This distinction
carries over into current practice and understanding. For example,
Ambassador John Negroponte (the first Director of National
Intelligence (DNI)) described three separate “dimensions of
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intelligence-foreign, military, and domestic.”18 Randol suggests that
“homeland security intelligence” is an integrating element that can be
superimposed upon this construct, yet Randol notes, “With respect to
institution building, the approach remains federal-centric.”19
Of importance to the current discussion is the fact that, traditionally,
most consider domestic intelligence to be almost a purely federal
endeavor, although all levels of U.S. government, local, state, and
federal have domestic intelligence roles and functions. As a
consequence, part of the domestic intelligence debate involves
understanding the distinctions and interactions between internal
security and law enforcement.
To Kent, security intelligence is:
the intelligence behind the police function. Its job is to protect the
nation and its members from malefactors who are working to our
national and individual hurt one of its most dramatic forms it is the
intelligence which continuously is trying to put the finger on
clandestine agents sent here by foreign powers. In another, it is the
activity which protects our frontiers against other undesirable
gatecrashers; illegal entrants, smugglers, dope runners. By and large,
security intelligence is the knowledge and the activity which our
defensive police forces must have before they take specific action
against the individual ill-wisher or ill-doer.20
In a RAND study on reorganizing domestic intelligence in the United
States, Treverton defined domestic intelligence as:
efforts by government organizations to gather, assess, and
act on information about individuals or organizations in the
United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that is not
necessarily related to the investigation of a known past
criminal act specific planned criminal activity.21
Treverton asserts that collection, analysis, and action are the three core
functions of domestic intelligence.22 While that is certainly true, the
questions before us are rather more complex: How are those functions
77
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organized within the federal government, among the various states,
with local police and sheriffs, upon what basis, and to what operational
end? Further, how do current domestic operations engage with civil
liberties, and what is the historical and political context within which
all of this is occurring?

Historical Context of the US Domestic Intelligence
Discussion
Wide-ranging—and critical—discussions of domestic intelligence
activities within the United States are not new. The last major focus
on these issues was in the 1970s, when a series of scandals in the
national political arena focused attention on the intelligence
community and its methods. Crucially, in 1974—in the wake of the
Watergate scandal— the New York Times published Hersh’s expose
of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert activities abroad as
well as its alleged illegal activities within the United States.23
In January of the following year, several investigatory commissions
were established to determine the depth and breadth of the alleged
abuses.
The President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United
States, headed by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, was the first
investigative effort.24 Formed by President Gerald Ford on January
4, 1975, it issued a single report in 1975, which delineated some CIA
abuses, including mail opening and surveillance of domestic
dissident groups. The Rockefeller Commission found that while
there were individual incidents of abuse and improper activity, the
bulk of CIA activity in the domestic arena was consistent with its
statutory authority and mandate. The Rockefeller Commission was
widely viewed as a whitewash and the debate on domestic
intelligence was continued in the subsequent Church and Pike
Committees.25
While the Rockefeller Commission laid the groundwork for opening
up intelligence and exposing its activities to policymakers and the
public, the turning point for a public discussion of intelligence came
with congressional inquiry into alleged intelligence excesses. In
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January 1975, the Senate established a committee—the United States
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities—led by Sen. Frank Church (D-ID),
while the House investigation, led by Congressman Pike, began its
work some months later. The Pike Committee investigation attracted
criticism, due to its inappropriate handling of classified material and
the sloppy nature of the investigation. The committee report leaked
in its entirety to the Village Voice.26
The Church Committee, in contrast, was able to balance against the
negative perception of the Pike Committee and attract a level of
bipartisan support for its activities.27 Senator Frank Church’s
presidential aspirations heightened the profile of the committee; he
was eager for the limelight and used his committee’s investigations
to help him obtain it.28 It was discovered through the Church
Committee investigation, which lasted around 16 months, that the
CIA, FBI and NSA had each focused some of their intelligencegathering capabilities internally, on American citizens.29 The form
these operations took varied with the agencies involved.
Most notoriously, the FBI investigated, infiltrated, and attempted to
disrupt the activities of student groups, labor organizations, and
other social groups. Citizens were harassed and threatened by FBI
agents in response to what Sen. Walter Mondale called an “enormous
unrestricted fear about the American people.”30 The activities of the
FBI ranged from the obscene to the ridiculous and focused on a range
of targets—from the high profile to the regular citizen. As an example,
the Bureau tried to convince Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to commit
suicide by threatening to expose his alleged sexual dalliances.
Women's organizations and peace groups were infiltrated by agents
and their activities disrupted by these agents provocateur. Most
shocking was that these activities of the federal government were
conducted with minimal to no oversight.
As scholar Theoharis puts it:
[The Church Committee] discovered that the presidents and
their attorneys general in some cases had no knowledge of the
79
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scope and purpose of highly questionable FBI activities and in
others sought to avoid meeting their oversight responsibilities.
They also discovered that FBI investigations were not confined
to criminals or suspected spies but also targeted individuals
and organizations engaged in legitimate political activities.31
The FBI was not the only agency exposed by the investigations of the
Church Committee. The CIA had also been involved domestically in
intelligence operations, in the form of OPERATION CHAOS,
intended to gather information on American dissidents. Ultimately,
the illegal CIA operation collected files on 1,200 American citizens.32
The NSA was also involved in questionable activities directed
against the American people in the form of two operations: Projects
SHAMROCK and MINARET; the first involved opening personal
telegrams over the course of thirty years, and the second focused on
the electronic surveillance of American citizens.33 The Church
Committee revelations led to a series of reforms, particularly the
establishment of oversight mechanisms in the House and Senate, as
well as a legal structure to control the gathering of foreign
intelligence in the United States—the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), passed in 1978.
In retrospect, the turmoil and debate over intelligence abuses and
liberty interests in the 1960s and 1970s are a crucial inflection point.
While the bureaucratic construct has changed—and will continue to
do so—the balance between intelligence and liberty is one of constant
debate and refinement and these mid-twentieth century episodes
catalyzed this discussion. In the case of the investigations of the
1970s, the secret activities of the intelligence agencies were brought
into the public sphere for the first time, where they were assessed for
their appropriateness and legality. The lines were then drawn for a
greater discussion of how intelligence should engage with society in a
democracy, and institutions established to maintain these standards.
This article now turns to foreign perspectives on domestic
intelligence and internal security intelligence.
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Foreign Perspectives
Domestic intelligence is not unique to the United States. Indeed,
all states require and employ domestic intelligence in order to
support their internal security functions. When reviewing
domestic intelligence practice in other democracies—specifically,
the United Kingdom’s (UK's) Security Service (widely known as
MI-5), France's Directorate of Territorial Security (DST), the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Australian
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), it becomes apparent
that these organizations share common attributes. These
attributes are a “culture of prevention,” collaborative relationships
with local law enforcement, a human intelligence (HUMINT)
emphasis, the development of regular threat assessments, and the
ability to recruit from a wider pool of talent outside of law
enforcement.34 Indeed in a 2007 paper, James Burch looked at the
prospects for a U.S. domestic intelligence agency concluding that
there are immense cultural obstacles to establishing a US domestic
intelligence agency. These obstacles may favor reforming existing
entities and their relationships with other agencies.35
Arguably, the American experience of domestic intelligence is
different from these other democracies—culture, history, and legal
history create a different framework and set of requirements in terms
of domestic intelligence from other, even comparable democracies.36
Nevertheless, similarities exist. These similarities include the focus on
the importance of separating intelligence from law enforcement,
insisting that the arrest function be separate from the intelligencegathering function. This obviously serves to separate powers and
ensure that there exists an appropriate check on the power of both
sides of this equation through the involvement of the criminal justice
system. Other similarities include a focus on the importance of
oversight mechanisms, as well as on the integral function of
interagency liaison, cooperation, and information-sharing. Domestic
intelligence is somewhat distinct in that it requires—to varying
degrees—involvement with local communities as well as the creation
of regional structures that integrate the skills and information of a
range of agencies.
81
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The Congressional Research Service (CRS) also reviewed the British
experience in their assessment “Domestic Intelligence in the United
Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States.”37
That CRS Report observed that while there may be lessons to be
learned from the British experience with domestic intelligence,
there are key differences between United States and British
governmental, legal, cultural and political norms. These include
political and Constitutional approaches. Most importantly, unlike
the United States, Britain does not have a written constitution that
specifies individual rights. In addition, the British system
concentrates national political power in a unitary Parliament, while
in the United States power is distributed through a federalist
system. Organizationally, the United Kingdom has chosen to
separate its domestic intelligence entity (the Security Service known
as MI-5) from its various law enforcement agencies. 38 In the United
States, this function is combined at the federal level. Both federal
law enforcement and domestic intelligence are a responsibility
within the FBI—an arm of the Department of Justice.
In the UK, MI-5 is the agency focusing on domestic threats to national
security. This includes developing counterterrorism intelligence, as well as
addressing critical infrastructure protection and serious organized crime
(including money laundering, the proliferation of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear defense, cyber-threats, and the smuggling of
people, weapons, and drugs. MI-5 is supported Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre, which is a fusion center for analysis/synthesis of domestic and
foreign intelligence drawing from the Secret Intelligence Service, the
foreign agency, Government Communications Headquarters, the signals
intelligence agency, the Metropolitan Police (the lead CT police agency),
and key government departments. MI-5 also coordinates with the police
through the special branch structure, augmented by investigative counter
terrorism units and counterterrorism intelligence units with the
collaborative National Counter Terrorism Policing Network.
France has undergone several iterative transitions in its domestic
intelligence since 2007.39 In 2007, the Direction de la Surveillance du
Territoire (DST) and Direction Centrale des Renseignments Généraux
merged into a new the Direction central du renseignement intérieure
82
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1976

Sullivan and Lester: Revisiting Domestic Intelligence

(DCRI – Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence) and a new Conseil
nationale du renseignement (National Intelligence Council). Despite this
merger intelligence gaps persisted and a new reform led to disbanding the
DCRI and replacing it with another two new bodies in the Interior
Ministry. The lack of intelligence sharing between those new bodies, the
Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (Directorate-General for
Internal Security), focused on CT and counter-espionage; and the Service
central du renseignement territorial (Central Service of Territorial
Intelligence) in light of the January 2015 Charlie Hedbo attack.40 This led
to the establishment of a new coordinating body, the Etat-Major
Operationnelle de Prevention du Terrorisme (the Operational Staff for
Preventing Terrorism).41 Complexity and issues of co-ordination led to the
development of a new National Center for Counter Terrorism (Centre
national de contre-terrorisme) to oversee all French CT intelligence along
with a national intelligence coordinator (Coordonnateur nationaux du
renseignement) to supervise national CT capacities.
Canadian domestic intelligence is primarily the responsibility of the CSIS,
which was established in 1984. CSIS works closely with Communications
Security Establishment and the police service primarily the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The CSIS has expanded powers to take
active measures to disrupt terrorist attacks.42 In addition, a fusion center,
the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre at CSIS, and a watch center, the
National Security Joint Operations Centre at RCMP are in place to coordinate information sharing.
In Australia, the ASIO has a preventive role and is responsible for
interdicting attacks in addition to traditional intelligence collection and
dissemination. Like other domestic security intelligence agencies, the
ASIO does not have police or arrest authority, but it does have limited
authority to detain individuals for questioning to substantially assist a
terrorist intelligence investigation. This limited authority is not
independent and is exercised through the Australian Federal Police,
necessitating close co-operation between the ASIO and AFP.43
All four of these case studies demonstrate the complexity of domestic CT
intelligence enterprises. Multiple agencies from the intelligence services
interact with the police service and other law enforcement entities. Since
83
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the dedicated domestic security intelligence services are not police
agencies, collaborative relationships with the police are essential to their
success. Since they have no law enforcement function they can focus on
prevention, emphasize HUMINT, and develop regular threat assessments
to support the interagency CT domain. In all cases, the domestic security
services have evolved and adapted considering intelligence failures,
organizational complexity, and bureaucratic necessity.44
9-11, Counterterrorism, and Homeland Security Intelligence
The 9/11 attacks significantly changed the intelligence and national
security structures of the United States. In many ways, the true, longterm impacts of these changes are unknown, as the wake of
bureaucratic reorganization and the accompanying turf battles have
yet to settle, even twenty years later. While 9/11 brought the endemic
turf battles between the FBI and CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
into public discussion due to the failure to share the information
needed to recognize and prevent the 9/11 plot, such bureaucratic
competition was not new. Athan Theoharis examines these historic
turf-battles in The Quest for Absolute Security.45 Traditionally, the
FBI handled domestic issues, while the CIA handled foreign (with a
degree of overlap). Theoharis documents competition between the
FBI and CIA in overseas posts, their competition for Cold War
bureaucratic intelligence dominance, including conflicting
counterespionage approaches, and the CIA's illegal domestic
intelligence operations that culminated in the Church and Pike
Committee investigations.
Amy Zegart continues the examination of the institutional barriers
between US intelligence agencies in Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI,
and the Origins of 9/11.46 Zegart observes that the U.S. Intelligence
Community had the "stunning inability...to adapt to the end of the
Cold War."47 Essentially, Spying Blind is an account of bureaucratic
competition and resistance to change. Zegart documents
organizational dysfunction and adaptation failure at the CIA and
FBI and summarizes the various studies on intelligence reform and
the status of their recommendations. According to Zegart,
adaptation failure can be assessed through three questions:
84
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1. Did senior intelligence officials and policymakers
recognize the gravity of the threat posed by al-Qaeda
before September 11, and if so, when?
2. Did they understand the connection between the
terrorist threat and the imperative for organizational
change in U.S. intelligence agencies?
3. To what extent did they achieve the organizational
changes they believed were necessary? 48
The threats were recognized, but reorganization and reform overemphasized the foreign threat. For our purposes, the balance
between domestic and foreign intelligence, as well as the
interactions within the federal intelligence community and state
and local agencies, were not properly synchronized . These
shortfalls are pivotal since the threat information did not
effectively get to the National Capitol Region Threat Intelligence
Consortium, the Washington DC area fusion center.
In the domestic realm, the need for policed agencies to conduct
intelligence operations at all levels of government was recognized
(and apparently forgotten) well before 9/11. For example, in the
aftermath of the domestic intelligence scandals of the 1960s-70s,
the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals published a report on police intelligence for
extraordinary violence. This landmark report, Disorders and
Terrorism, articulated standards and goals for all sectors of
government. The chair of the Advisory Committee was Brendan T.
Byrne, governor of New Jersey. Jerry V. Wilson at the American
University chaired its task force on disorders and terrorism. 49
Among the standards promulgated was Standard 5.3 on the
Intelligence Function. This standard, which was intended for the
legislative bodies of the various states, recognized an “indispensable
role of intelligence gathering and the use of intelligence in the fight
against terrorism.”50 In addition, it pointed out the need for an
85
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appropriate balance between the need to protect the domestic
security and potential dangers to individual privacy and free
expression. These liberty concerns persist until today. In an effort to
address these issues, Standard 6.4, Self Regulation of Police
Intelligence Operations stated that the “Responsibility for
intelligence operations relating to extraordinary violence should be
clearly located within every police agency.”51 This function requires,
according to the standard, a designated official to oversee information
gathering, records maintenance, and information dissemination.
In addition, Standard 6.4 called for the police intelligence function to
collect:
a) Overtly available information [now known as open source
information or OSINT] on special crime trends, political events,
and other subject matters relevant to extraordinary violence;
b) Preventive intelligence on persons and groups suspected of
having serious potential for future criminal acts of disorder
and terrorism;
c) Strategic and tactical intelligence on persons or groups currently
suspected of criminal activity related to extraordinary violence. 52
These recommendations, while at first glance dated, are critical. These
are the lessons learned from the 1960s through the 1970s’ waves of
terrorism and disorder that were never fully integrated into domestic
intelligence practice. They could provide valuable context and
perspective to the much-needed contemporary debate.
In the wake of the attacks on 9/11, a series of investigations were
undertaken to determine where error occurred and where reform or
change should be implemented. Among them, the Gilmore
Commission—officially the Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction—which had actually begun its work prior to the
attacks, focused its attention on promulgating measures for state and
local governments in order to prepare for domestic terrorist threats. 53
The commission’s final report proposed a range of improvements on
readiness in terms of homeland security, focusing particularly on the
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inextricable relationship between federal, state, local levels as well as
on the role of the private sector. The committee also pointed out that a
civil liberties oversight board should be established, as should
guidelines for acceptable uses of the military domestically. Further
recommendations included engaging academia and others in research
and development and critical infrastructure protection.54
The renewed recognition that law enforcement agencies had a role in
understanding the terrorist threat that emerged after 9/11 briefly
resulted in an emphasis on security intelligence. Rather than
establishing a domestic security service, the emphasis has been on
information sharing through the development of fusion centers at the
state and major city level. Fusion centers are essentially interagency,
and often multidisciplinary operations watch and analysis centers for
fusing terrorist threat information. They are intended to serve as a
two-way conduit between the federal intelligence community and state
and local agencies. While the fusion center movement is maturing, its
progress is uneven. Nevertheless, it is a platform for sharing (but
usually not collecting) domestic intelligence.
The ultimate shape of fusion centers and the relationship to domestic
intelligence writ large is still evolving. The basic definition of fusion
centers was articulated in a set of fusion center guidelines developed
through the U.S. Department of Justice Global Justice Information
Sharing Initiative in cooperation with the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.55 These guidelines released in 2005 have been
updated with asset of baseline capabilities in 2008. 56 Additional
guidance is now found in a series of supplemental sponsored by
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).57 In addition to these
documents, the United States Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), disseminated a “National Strategy for the
National Network of Fusion Centers” in July 2014. This vision
document covered the period 2014-2017.58 Despite efforts, fusion
centers have yet to realize their full potential and the need to refine a
lack of analytical focus in the domestic realm remains. A potential
model for refining the state of analytical practice can be found in the
Terrorism Early Warning Group model.59
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The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) model is both a precursor and
methodology for implementing fusion for counterterrorism
intelligence. The TEW Group concept emerged in Los Angeles in 1996
as a way to bridge the gaps in traditional intelligence and security
structures. The Los Angeles TEW included analysts from local, state
and federal agencies to produce a range of intelligence products at all
phases of response (pre-, trans-, and post attack) specifically tailored
to the user's operational role and requirements. The TEW model
bridges criminal and operational intelligence to support strategic and
tactical users. The TEW model advocates development of a distributed
network with the potential to co-produce intelligence to counter
networked threats.60 “Developing the intelligence needed to anticipate,
prevent, disrupt, or mitigate the effects of an attack requires the
production of intelligence in a collaborative and integrated endeavor
by a number of agencies across this dispersed area. This is known as
'co-production' of intelligence.”61
In essence, the TEW was designed as a node in a counter-terrorist
intelligence network. These concepts are detailed in depth in the text
Terrorism Early Warning: 10 Years of Achievement in Fighting
Terrorism and Crime.62 Within the TEW model intelligence a
distinction between criminal operational intelligence is emphasized.
Criminal intelligence focuses on crime suppression and criminal
prosecution, while operational intelligence is the “processed
information needed to understand the current and future situation,
including the capabilities and intentions of an adversary in order to
conduct operational missions at all phases of response.” 63
Law enforcement, police, or crime intelligence activities are a
significant component of domestic intelligence at all levels of
government. If one goes beyond a federal, bureaucratic perspective, it
is apparent that intelligence can be gathered, processed, analyzed,
and applied to a wide range of activities, including policing a
community. Unfortunately, in the wake of the domestic intelligence
controversies of the 1960s and 1970s that culminated in the Church
Committee hearings, law enforcement or criminal intelligence
became marginalized, something police administrators feared rather
than exploited.
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The nature of contemporary terrorism, disorder, extremism, and
security threats place state and local agencies at the front line of both
prevention and response to terrorism and other homeland security
threats. Intelligence is an important element to understanding
terrorist threats, crafting homeland security response, and
preventing terrorist and criminal activity. Yet, prior to 9/11, most
intelligence for these threats was outward-looking foreign
intelligence or concentrated in the efforts of a few major
metropolitan areas (notably New York, Washington, DC, and Los
Angeles), and the federal government (largely through the FBI, and
its network of Joint Terrorism Task Forces). That has changed.

Contemporary Domestic Intelligence Controversies
Failed Intelligence Reform? Domestic Spying, Networks, and
Hierarchies
Domestic intelligence remains a controversial issue in the United
States. As previously stated, the optimal configuration of a domestic
security service, and the responsibilities of such a service or services
remains open. Ultimately, the domestic intelligence equation is a
matter of balancing operational security needs, political and
bureaucratic imperatives, liberty interests and the threat
environment. In the United States, federalism, and a diverse law
enforcement community complicate the situation. There is no single
national police service, and a domestic intelligence service at the
federal level would share responsibility and turf with a multitude of
state and local actors operating with a range of priorities.
From a federal perspective, domestic intelligence is a component of
national intelligence. As such the federal view emphasizes activities
by the Intelligence Community (IC) and looks at integration with
state, local, territorial, and tribal entities as partnerships.64 This is
reasonable yet minimizes the role of state and local (especially
metropolitan police) agencies in the production and dissemination of
intelligence within their own domain and vertically into the federal IC
framework. Specifically, this federal bias views activities such as
89
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criminal intelligence, homeland security information, and suspicious
activity reporting as interacting with IC activities, yet separate. 65
The distinctions between foreign and domestic intelligence continue to
color the debate about the nature and structure of domestic
intelligence.66 Concerns about global terrorism are likely to stimulate
future changes to this balance. In short, the domestic intelligence arena
is viewed largely as a federal endeavor but is a national effort involving
interaction between competing federal agencies and state, local, and tribal
entities. The current interaction is notionally grounded in the national
network of fusion centers, but that framework remains immature,
requiring investment in skills development, doctrine, accountability, and
oversight.
Metropolitan police are increasingly reliant upon intelligence in
order to prevent and adequately respond to terrorist threats and
transnational crime. To fill this need, some police agencies are
enhancing their intelligence gathering and analysis apparatus. The
efforts of the New York Police Department (NYPD) to build a
counterterrorism intelligence program are a pertinent example. 67
The January 6 insurrection is another salient example.
The NYPD's liaison program—which is based on the premise that
“The war on terrorism has no national boundaries and now the
NYPD doesn't either”—is referred to by New York's Police
Foundation (which partially funds the program) as “Global
Policing in the 21st Century.” It has deployed detectives to 15 cities
worldwide including: Toronto, Montreal, Santo Domingo, London,
Paris, Lyon, Madrid, The Hague, Tel Aviv, Amman, Singapore, and
Sydney.68 These NYPD detectives are essentially intelligence liaison
officers. They are unarmed and are not directly involved in
investigations or enforcement actions. Their role blurs the
traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic
intelligence.69 While their focus is solely liaison and information
exchange, “their presence overseas has strained the department's
often tense relations with the [FBI]. In Israel, for instance, the
bureau [FBI] opposed creating the post for the department's
detective, according to American and Israeli officials.”70 According
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to reportage by journalist Judith Miller, the FBI resents NYPD's
efforts to collect its own intelligence.71
Fusion Centers
After 9/11, effort was devoted to establishing a national network of
fusion centers to address domestic intelligence needs.72 The network,
however, has been fraught with controversy over civil liberties
concerns, and a lack of standards, doctrine (network protocols), and
training/education in the process of intelligence production. The
emphasis was ostensibly on information sharing among all levels of
government (local, state, and federal) and among various disciplines:
law enforcement, fire, and health, as well as sharing with critical
infrastructure sectors. That goal was never fully realized due to issues
of bureaucratic competition and organizational culture (within the
federal interagency and among the numerous state, local, and federal
agencies participating in the endeavor).73 Critics of the system claim
the fusion centers, as currently constituted, are ineffective, spending
billions in taxpayer dollars with little tangible result toward
combatting terrorism.74 These issues are also complicated by the
emphasis on information sharing itself. The core of the issue is the
production of intelligence—or ideally, the networked ‘co-production’
of intelligence—to alert, warn, and shape policy and operational
responses to a range of threats (including terrorism and violent
extremism).
Is the current fusion center network viable? In the aftermath of the
January 6 capitol insurrection, scrutiny of the role of fusion centers is
scarce. The fact that NTIC, the fusion center in the national Capital
Region, apparently did not receive adequate warning remains
unexplored.75 Was its absence due to political interference or
politicization?
The January 6, 2021 insurrection—attack on the U.S. capitol to overthrow
the Presidential election—raises profound questions about the state of
domestic intelligence.76 These questions include the scope of partisan
political interference, the capacity of fusion centers to detect and analyze
emerging threat intelligence, the ability to understand current intelligence,
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and the pathways to share threat warnings with operational entities (such
as the United States Capitol Police, and the Washington, DC Metropolitan
Police) related to domestic intelligence and active threats. The resolution
to the questions remains elusive and are occluded by partisan warfare
awaiting a comprehensive review and criminal investigation of the
January 6 insurrection.
The suspect actions to limit intelligence due to potential politicization
during the Trump Administration are a good example. In August 2020,
Benjamin Wittes recounted repeated efforts by the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) to limit the DHS Inspector General
from reviewing the agency’s intelligence products. These affronts to the
intelligence oversight norms established in the aftermath of the Watergate
scandal and Church Commission that sought to remedy those abuses are a
clear indication of the politicization of intelligence and the need for
domestic intelligence reform. After all, the efforts to suppress oversight are
related to efforts to obscure inappropriate intelligence collection and
dissemination (and implicitly analysis) by DHS I&A.77
This lack of transparency is not new. Fusion centers have been long
subject to criticism. For example, Open the Government noted that, “State
and local fusion centers,” created to share counterterrorism intelligence
across government agencies to prevent the failures that contributed to the
9/11 terror attacks in 2001, exhibit a persistent pattern of violating
Americans’ privacy and civil liberties, producing unreliable and ineffective
information, and resisting financial and other types of standard public
accountability.” This activity often suggests a prima facie bias, especially
in instances related to monitoring demonstrations, “Fusion centers,
including those in Chicago, Memphis and Boston, continue to conduct
monitoring on activity that should be protected by the First Amendment,
including free speech, freedom religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom
of the press.”78
Again, Open the Government observes, “Despite strong criticism and
recommendations from the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations in 2012, the fusion centers and the federal agencies
providing so much of their funding have made few, if any, meaningful
92
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.1.1976

Sullivan and Lester: Revisiting Domestic Intelligence

improvements to improve effectiveness and public accountability.”79 It
concludes, “Intelligence shared by fusion centers continues to be
unreliable and ineffective.”80 The scope and practice of intelligence
analysis and production remains immature at best despite repeated
criticism. A significant concern is monitoring political and First
Amendment protected speech and activities by personnel without requisite
oversight and training.
In 2012, fusion centers faced serious criticism from the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations.81 According to the committee, fusion centers “frequently
produced ‘shoddy, rarely timely’ reports that in some cases violated civil
liberties or privacy and often had little to do with terrorism.”82 In addition,
fusion center grant expenditures lacked oversight. A review of five fusion
centers found that federal funds were used to purchase dozens of flat
screen televisions, two sport utility vehicles, cell phone tracking devices
and other surveillance equipment unrelated to the analytical mission of a
fusion center.83
Sen. Coburn (R-OK) noted that:
Unfortunately, DHS has resisted oversight of these centers. The
Department opted not to inform Congress of the public of serious
problems plaguing its fusion center and broader intelligence efforts.
When this Subcommittee requested documents that would help it
identify these issues, the Department initially resisted turning them
over, arguing that they were protected by privilege, too sensitive to
share, were protected by confidentiality agreements, or did not exist
at all.84
This is closer to reality than the apologies published by bureaucratic
proponents of the status quo. Fusion centers could be an asset, but they
are still poorly integrated into the federal system and lack robust fullchannel network connectivity. They largely disseminate information
developed by other entities and mirror those reports in their
dissemination, often duplicating efforts of other entities.
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“In reality, the Subcommittee investigation found that the fusion centers
often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting
to DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever.” Basic
understanding of intelligence analysis tradecraft is still lacking. This is due
to lack of institutional knowledge and domain expertise.
A 2015 Brookings blog summarizing that criticism noted that the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “which issued a scathing
report in 2012…argued that, fusion centers provided low-quality
intelligence to the federal government and were not contributing in a
meaningful way to counterterrorism efforts.”85 That 2012 report
overstated the effectiveness and utility of fusion centers as currently
configured and underestimates the deficiencies, focusing only on criticism
regarding civil liberties concerns and grant funding priorities and avoiding
underlying issues regarding training, and doctrine. The essay recaps
anecdotal examples of success but they are derived from other reports
rather than independent assessments of capability and effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the rise of domestic rightwing extremism and the attempted
overthrow of the Presidential election during the January 6, 2021
insurrection call the current domestic intelligence structures into question.
Fusion centers remain core elements of federal, state, and local
interaction, yet they have not yet adapted to the profound domestic
intelligence challenges posed by right wing extremists and potential rightwing terrorists.
Each fusion center has a unique, local flavor. That is valuable since it helps
the centers meet local needs, but it also raises challenges. New institutions
like fusion centers must be planned in a public, open manner, and their
implications for privacy and other key values carefully thought out and
debated. And like any powerful institution in a democracy, they must be
constructed in a carefully bounded and limited manner with sufficient
checks and balances to prevent abuse.”86 Concerns raised by the American
Civil Liberties Union include: Ambiguous lines of authority, private sector
participation, military participation, data fusion—data mining, and
excessive secrecy. While each of these concerns warrants scrutiny, they are
not necessarily flaws. They can be strengths if properly managed and
subject to effective oversight. Clear doctrine for addressing these issues is
still an aspiration, rather than a reality.
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Conclusion: Is Domestic Intelligence Reform Still Viable?
Domestic intelligence is critical to ensuring security and governance.
It is also essential to preserving liberties. Domestic intelligence
reform is necessary to calibrate the national intelligence framework to
address the emerging and evolving threats faced internally, as well as
those continuing external threats. Indeed, cross-cutting global
challenges87 like advanced technology, climate security,88
transnational crime, maritime security,89 and networked right wing
extremism90 are interconnected with domestic and foreign
dimensions.
As Amy Zegart observed:
The threat landscape is changing dramatically—just as it did
after the Cold War—and not because of a single emerging
terrorist group or a rising nation-state. Advances in artificial
intelligence, open-source internet-based computing,
biotechnology, satellite miniaturization, and a host of other
fields are giving adversaries new capabilities; eroding America’s
intelligence lead; and placing even greater demands on
intelligence agencies to separate truth from deception. But the
US intelligence community is not responding quickly enough to
these technological changes and the challenges they are
unleashing…Now, as in the run-up to 9/11, early indicators of
the coming world are evident, and the imperative for
intelligence reform is clear.91
These developments demonstrate a clear need for renewed intelligence
reform. While Zegart’s essay addresses the global picture, the need is also
acute on the domestic front—especially as the distinction between foreign
and domestic continues to blur.
While 9/11 provided an impetus for intelligence reform, it was short
lived—especially on the domestic front. As Darrren Tromblay noted,
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Unfortunately, even after 9/11, the national security enterprise has
struggled with implementing a whole-of-government (and private
sector) approach to national security. Fusion centers, for which
DHS manages the Fusion Center Performance Program and, more
recently, the NCTC’s Interagency Threat Assessment and
Coordination Group/Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team,
have not proven to be the most efficient mechanisms for
establishing a two-way relationship with state and local authorities
in furtherance of counterterrorism objectives.92
Post 9/11 intelligence reform is incomplete. Indeed, it was never fully
understood nor was it integrated into the United States experience. This is
especially evident considering the January 6, 2021 insurrection attack on
the Capitol. Due to reform fatigue, the initial—untested—crisis responses
became the new foundation for domestic intelligence. Reform efforts also
became the battleground for new bureaucratic contests for turf, prestige,
and funding. All of these translate into contests for power. The imperatives
of intelligence, as articulated in Sherman Kent’s imperatives for analytical
objectivity, became over-run by political objectives. Domestic intelligence
has become politicized. The situation is the same on the foreign side of the
house.93 The current politicization of intelligence creates great risk as it
ignores ground truth for political dominance. The case of violent rightwing extremism, including white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups is an
alarming case in point. The Trump administration especially political
appointees in DHS—expressly rejected addressing the rise of right-wing
violence in the aftermath of Black Lives Matter protests, often conflating
protest, direct action, riots, and terrorism from the left while ignoring
direct action and terrorism from the extreme right. As reported by Betsy
Woodruff Swan, “They tried to get Trump to care about right-wing
terrorism. He ignored them.”94
Twenty years after 9/11, United States domestic intelligence is carried out
by multiple, loosely connected—and often competing—organizations.
These agencies include the FBI, other Federal entities, such as the DHS
and Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as state and local police.
The current situation shares attributes of both a network and hierarchy.
Creation of a new dedicated federal, domestic intelligence agency for
counterterrorism and transnational threats is one option that needs to be
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explored further. Such an agency could be a stand-alone entity, an agencywithin an agency, or a distributed network. The analysis of these potential
alternatives is just beginning.
The domestic intelligence domain is once again in need of significant
reform—a reform that remains largely unfinished after the initial impulse
to build new capacity after the 9/11 attacks. The major new capacities were
three-fold: The creation of DHS, the establishment of the ODNI, and the
promotion of a national network of fusion centers. The results of these
efforts are uneven. There are significant levels of bureaucratic
competition. For example, the roles of the FBI and DHS are often
competing and duplicative, politicization has diminished the
independence of the ODNI, and fusion centers still lack unified network
standards in terms of common training, doctrine, and defined pathways
for multi-lateral communication and the co-production of intelligence.
Civil liberties and privacy issues remain a concern.
The need to examine domestic intelligence in a holistic, national—rather
than federal—framework remains. It is time to revisit the network
architecture of a national domestic intelligence capacity. This reassessment needs to look at oversight, privacy concerns, the rise of new
technology, and the growing connections between domestic and
international (global) threats such as the rise of global networks comprised
of violent right-wing extremists, authoritarian states, and violent non-state
actors. The suitability of current organizational roles, including potential
reforms to fusion centers, and the potential role and models for a national
domestic intelligence service is once again a necessary. This article
provides a starting point for that assessment.
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